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"Imagine that. Another financial/corporate scandal/crisis. But
which of the current 'scandals' or 'crises' are we talking
about? There are, after all, so many."
-Professor M Thomas Arnold'
"You know, half the people in this place could be prosecuted"
-Oliver Stone2
1. INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS
Since at least the Watergate era almost forty years ago, 3 American busi-
ness has been plagued by a long, sorry history of corrupt and dishonest activity.4
While it appears that the large majority of U.S. companies have operated in an
ethical and reputable fashion,' a significant number have not. Just in the last
decade, after the bursting of the Dot-corn bubble, the litany of major corporate
frauds has been unending.6 The economic meltdown of 2008 has yielded the
latest and most damaging fruits of this deceitful business behavior.
As a consequence, America needs strong and productive shareholder
remedies not only to compensate investors for losses they suffer because of such
wrong-doing, but also to combat and deter it. To that end, this Article will first
present a brief account of these corporate scandals, focusing particularly on
Professor and former Dean, Gonzaga University Law School. The author would like to
thank colleagues Lynn Dagget, Brooks Holland, and Gerry Hess, as well as Lance Gotthoffer,
Barry Kaplan, Craig Smith, and Nowell Bamberger for their helpful suggestions. He would also
like to acknowledge the fine assistance of law student Forrest Fischer.
This article is dedicated to the author's dear brother, John Paul Morrissey (1961-2010), taken all
too early from this life.
I M. Thomas Arnold, "It's Deja Vu All Over Again": Using Bounty Hunters to Leverage
Gatekeeper Duties, 45 TULSA L. REv. 419, 420 (2010).
2 Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Walk Across Stone's Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at Bl.
Stone, the director of two movies about the American financial community-WALL STREET
(Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987) and WALL STREET: MONEY NEVER SLEEPS (Edward R.
Pressman 2010)-made those remarks at a swanky restaurant in midtown Manhattan where many
leading financiers had gathered for lunch.
See Arnold, supra note 1.
4 For an excellent summary of these dishonest dealings, see Arnold, supra note 1, at 420-24.
For a report on this finding, see MARK S. BEASELEY ET AL., COMMISSION OF SPONSORING
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION ("COSO"), FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING,
1998-2007: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES (2010). "The vast majority of public com-
panies appear to provide financial reports that are free from material misstatements due to fraud."
Id. at 2.
6 See infra text accompanying note 30.
See infra text accompanying note 57.
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those that have come to light in the last decade.8 Part of that story is the general-
ly ineffective efforts of government regulators to police such harmful conduct.9
As a piece of that history, this Article will then describe several legisla-
tive initiatives since the Watergate era that were passed in response to those
frauds. 1o The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank")," signed into law by President Barack H. Obama in July 2010,
is only the most recent.12 One can hope that its ambitious attempts at financial
reform will end or at least substantially stifle corrupt business activity. Howev-
er, the mixed results from similar law-making efforts during earlier times do not
offer encouragement for such optimism.
Of necessity then, this Article will next present the case for keeping
some viable complements to those laws targeting corporate fraud. These alterna-
tive remedies are vigorous class action law suits and derivative actions. These
remedies are needed so that defrauded shareholders may effectively seek redress
under causes of action provided in the federal securities laws. Unfortunately,
those substantive claims have been weakened by several recent judicial deci-
sions.
Then, this Article will focus on the principal legal mechanisms that
shareholders can use to enforce those rights: class actions and derivative suits.
This Article will answer the three principal criticisms leveled at them. Two of
those arguments question the efficacy of shareholder class actions. "Pocket-
Shifting," charges that, in those suits, stockholders indirectly end up paying
their own claims, and "Circularity" alleges that investor gains and losses from
such frauds often cancel each other out over time. As such, these remedies are
said to produce only insignificant benefits for stockholders. While there may be
some negligible truth in those observations, the benefits from these actions-
most importantly, their deterrent and punitive impact-far outweigh any short-
comings.
The other criticism, the perceived problem of the professional plaintiff,
is no longer an issue in class actions, but it continues to be raised as an argument
against derivative suits, a remedy that is much needed to hold corporate officials
accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duties. As with the "Pocket-Shifting"
and "Circularity" charges, this criticism is also an insignificant distraction to a
meritorious legal mechanism. The final segment of this section will suggest
ways that class action law suits and derivative actions can be strengthened by
legislative activity that will correct those regrettable decisions.13
8 See discussion infra Parts II.C.-D.
9 See discussion infra Part II.C.
10 See discussion infra Part II.E.
I Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
12 See discussion infra Parts II.A.-B.
1 See discussion infra Part V.E.
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The Article will conclude by urging courts to remain receptive to these
vital antidotes to corporate misconduct. They cannot be oblivious to the scan-
dals and meltdowns that continue to weaken the United States economy. For
instance, a renowned business journalist stated that "corporate fraud is sort of
like grass, it grows, it gets cut down, and it grows again."l 4 Unless alert share-
holders and their lawyers are given these tools to keep it in check, corruption
may overrun the American economy and destroy the integrity it must have if
truly productive enterprises are to thrive.
II. CORPORATE CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC COLLAPSE, AND GOVERNMENTAL
RESPONSE
The link between securities fraud and financial calamity goes back at
least to the Great Depression. A congressional committee found in 1933 that
"[w]hatever may be the full catalogue of the forces that brought to pass the
present depression, not least among these has been this wanton misdirection of
the capital resources of the Nation."15 In response, Congress passed two land-
mark pieces of reform legislation.
A. Significant New Deal Legislation Responding to the Great Depression
The first legislation, the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"),16 re-
quired that securities be registered with a government agency before salel 7 and
made it a crime in that context not to disclose all material aspects of a busi-
ness.' 8 The companion legislation, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
change Act"),19 contained a host of provisions regulating the trading of securi-
ties, including a requirement that widely-held companies make periodic and
current reports about their operations20 to the public which must include audited
financial statements. It also established a federal regulatory agency, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), 21 to administer and
enforce the new federal securities laws.
14 Kurt Eichenwald, The Last Two Years: The Momentous Changes in Corporate America, 45
S. TEx. L. REV. 245, 246 (2003).
'5 H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2-3 (1933).
16 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
'7 Securities Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006).
18 Securities Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006).
'9 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)).
20 Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). This information includes the annual report
on Form 10-K required by Exchange Act Rule 13a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2011); the quarterly
report on Form 10-Q required by Exchange Act Rule 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2011); and
current reports on Form 8-K required by Exchange Act Rule 13a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11
(2011).
21 Exchange Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2006).
[Vol. 114534
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Next, in the mid-1970s, Watergate-related investigations revealed that
hundreds of public companies had kept off-book funds that they used for what
were euphemistically called "questionable payments."2 2 According to a 1976
cover story in Time magazine, "[tihe record of U.S. corporations indulging in
bribes, kickbacks and political payoffs is already voluminous; yet it is sure to
swell." 23 In response Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
("FCPA"),2 4 which not only explicitly made such activity illegal, but also reen-
forced the Exchange Act's reporting requirements. This act mandated that pub-
lic companies keep accurate books and records and maintain a system of ac-
counting controls to ensure compliance.2 5
B. Continuing Scandals, Bubbles, and Sarbanes-Oxley
Deregulation of the financial industry began early in President Ronald
Reagan's first few years in office and quickly led to the thrift scandals. The
foremost of those involved the notorious Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal; it
even implicated Senator John McCain, a future Republican presidential nomi-
nee.26 The 1980s also saw a boom in mergers and hostile takeovers. The signa-
ture statement of that era was "Greed is Good," made in a business school
commencement address by financier Ivan Boesky shortly before he was indicted
for insider trading.27 Another emblematic figure of that time, junk-bond king
Michael Milken, financed many of those maneuvers, and also went to prison for
* * 28securities law violations.
In the next decade, "irrational exuberance" 29 led to a run-up of technol-
ogy stocks in the late 1990s. When that Dot-coin bubble burst, it revealed nu-
22 See Arnold, supra note 1, at 427.
23 Scandals: A Record of Corporate Corruption, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 30. Another notorious
fraud of that era was Equity Funding. It was engineered by the creation of hundreds of false insur-
ance policies and ultimately reached the Supreme Court in a storied case. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983). There, a securities analyst who brought the scandal to light had been censured by the
SEC, but his sanction was overturned by the High Court. Id
24 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
25 Exchange Act § 13(b)(A)-(B), 15 U.S.C § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
26 The Lincoln Savings and Loan Investigation: Who is Involved, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1989 at
B8.
27 PATRICK DILLON & CARL M. CANNON, CIRCLE OF GREED 108 (2010). Boesky's remarks
served as the template for Gordon Geicko's famous "Greed is Good" address to a shareholders'
meeting in Oliver Stone's 1987 movie WALL STREET. See Sorkin, supra note 2.
28 DILLON & CANNON, supra note 27, at 109.
29 The famous phrase, of course, comes from a speech by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan in December, 1996. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the
Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research (Dec. 5, 1996), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm. Among other things, it
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merous frauds. Most notorious were Enron and other high-flying energy and
telecom companies.3 0 Over two dozen of those large public companies admitted
to inflating their revenue through improper accounting practices," with those
falsified financial reports making possible a wanton system of executive greed.32
Corrupt market analysts were fellow-travelers with those dishonest corporate
officials. They supplied them with doctored research reports on their companies
and touted soaring internet stocks in public at the same time they were calling
them "junk" and other, more vulgar epithets in their personal emails.33
Once again Congress responded with tough legislation: the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"). 34 Among other things, it required top
executives of public companies to personally certify the accuracy of their finan-
cial statements and to vouch for the integrity of their systems of internal ac-
counting controls.35 Sarbanes-Oxley also contained provisions designed to
check executive dishonesty, including rules requiring forfeiture of bonuses
based on improper accounting statements 36 and rules prohibiting loans to corpo-
rate officials. In addition, it set up an oversight panel, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), to police the practices of public ac-
countants.38
provided the title of a fine book about those boom years: ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2000).
30 Two good books about the Enron scandal are BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE
SMARTEST GUYS IN THE RooM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) and
REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: How Two WALL STREET.JOURNAL REPORTERS
UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2003).
3 For a good summary of the most notorious of those scandals, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES, 540-47 (11th ed. 2010).
32 In 1965, a CEO made "twenty-four times as much as the average worker; in 2007, the mul-
tiple [increasing by ten fold] was two hundred and seventy-five." David Owen, The Pay Problem:
What's To Be Done About C.E.O. Compensation, NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 2009, at 58, 58.
3 See Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Conflict Probes Resolved at Citigroup
and Morgan-Stanley: Settlements Part of Spitzer-Inspired "Global Resolution" of Wall Street
Investigations (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/mediacenter/2003/apr/global resolution.html; Affidavit in Support of
Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law § 354, at 12, 34-35, In re Merrill
Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
34 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
3 Id. § 302.
36 Id. § 304.
3 Id. § 402.
3 Id. §§ 101-09. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Sarbanes-Oxley, but ruled that the method by which
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C. More Frauds During the Past Decade
Yet throughout the last decade, high-profile corporate scandals contin-
ued unabated. Those included late trading and market-timing schemes where
mutual fund managers enriched themselves at their investors' expense.3 9 A simi-
larly egregious practice that also came to light then was the back-dating of stock
option grants-a particularly pernicious form of corporate kleptomania involv-
ing hundreds of corporate officials. 40
In those situations, corrupt executives searched for a time before such
purchase rights were issued when the underlying shares were trading at a lower
price. They then clandestinely changed the grant dates of the options to make it
appear they were awarded at that earlier time, thus increasing the executives'
potential for gain when they exercised the options to buy the stock. One percep-
tive court compared this practice to betting on a winning horse after the race had
been won.4 1
A study released in May 2010 presented the big picture of financial
fraud during the last decade, cataloging 347 cases of false and misleading re-
porting brought by the SEC in the years from 1998 to 2007.42 That compared to
294 such matters initiated by the agency in the previous decade. Not only did
the raw number of those frauds increase, but also the dollar amounts jumped
precipitously to a total of $120 billion.
Those deceptive financial reports occurred in a number of industries and
most often involved either improper revenue recognition or overstatement of
assets. More than 80% of the chief executive officers and/or chief financial of-
ficers of those companies fraudulently presented a false impression of success at
their firms. That misleading information included untrue representations about
meeting earnings expectations, concealment of deteriorating conditions, and
inflation of stock prices.4 3 During the two days after those frauds were an-
nounced, the companies suffered, on average, abnormal stock price declines of
16.7%."
39 See Final Rule: Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio
Holdings, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8408 (Apr. 16, 2004). This illegal mutual fund activity
resulted in $4.3 billion in penalties. Paul H. Dawes & Kory Sorrell, Tools for the Imperfect In-
strument: Practical Advice for Investigating Stock Options Awards, 1157 PLI/CORP 641, 643
(2006).
40 The author has written extensively about that. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of Corpo-
rate Law: of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L.
REv. 973 (2007) [hereinafter "Path of Corporate Law"]; Daniel J. Morrissey, Remedies for Op-
tions Backdating, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 2006, at 26.
41 David Phelps, A Little Hollywood Logic Keeps UnitedHealth Lawsuit in Court,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 5, 2007, at 2D.
42 BEASELEY ET AL., supra note 5.
43 Id. at 3.
4 Id. at 6.
2012] 537
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However, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission ("COSO")4 5 report only detailed the SEC's detection and prosecu-
tion of financial frauds. The SEC, throughout its history, has generally enjoyed a
fine reputation for aggressively pursuing corporate wrongdoing.4 6 Yet even in
the late 1970s when the SEC's reputation was at its zenith, the author, then a
junior staff attorney in its Enforcement Division, was told by a senior SEC law-
yer that it had the resources to prosecute no more than 2% of the occurring se-
curities law violations.47 Recent events have presented an even more dismal
assessment of the SEC's effectiveness.
During the last several years, the SEC, according to knowledgeable ob-
servers, "lost its watchdog soul to the interests it was created to regulate" 4 8 and
was "drained and demoralized throughout the Bush administration[.]" 49 Inade-
quate resources compounded that problem. As the SEC's current chairwoman,
Mary L. Schapiro, told Congress recently, "While the markets were growing
exponentially in size and complexity during the last several years, the SEC's
workforce actually decreased and its technology fell further behind."50 The
piece de resistance of the Commission's incompetence was the Bernard Madoff
affair. There a leading figure on Wall Street got away with a decades-long Pon-
zi scheme that bilked investors out of tens of billions of dollars. Despite the lon-
gevity and magnitude of his crime, Madoff was never caught by the SEC, but
was only prosecuted when he turned himself in."
45 See generally id The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
("COSO") is a joint initiative of five private sector accounting and financial organizations. It
states its mission as "providing thoughtful leadership through the development of comprehensive
frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, internal control, and fraud deterrence."
Id. at Inside Cover.
46 See, e.g., David L. Ratner, Response, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16
CARDOZO L. REv. 1765, 1779 (1995) (remarks of a former chairman of the Commission lauding
the SEC's generally high standard of performance during its first sixty years) ("The SEC is one
important reason why the securities industry is in so much better shape than other financial service
industries, and why U.S. securities markets are the best securities markets in the world.").
47 More recently, in December 2007, a well-respected commentator wrote, "It's no secret that
the Securities and Exchange Commission is terrifically understaffed and wildly underfunded
compared with the populous and wealthy Wall Street world it is supposed to police." Gretchen
Morgenson, Quick, Call Tech Support for the S.E.C, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, § 3, at 1. Shortly
thereafter, three former SEC chairmen echoed those sentiments with this statement: "The problem
with the S.E.C. today is that it lacks the money, manpower and tools it needs to do its job." Wil-
liam Donaldson et al., Muzzling the Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at Al9.
48 Michael Janeway, The Lord ofSpringwood, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at 10-11 (reviewing
CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPIONS OF FREEDOM (2003)).
49 Paul M. Barrett, While Regulators Slept, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at 10 (reviewing DAVID
WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC (2009)).
50 Charles Riley, SEC Starved for Reform Funds, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 11, 2011,
http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/11/news/economy/SEC funding/index.htm. The author recently
wrote emphasizing the need for strong funding for the SEC. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Wall St.
Needs This Beast, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 2011, at 42.
51 Peter Burrows, The SEC's MadoffMisery, Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 2009, at 24.
538 [Vol. 114
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Madoff's long-running fraud exemplified a regrettable aspect of our jus-
tice system. Most business criminals act with impunity. For instance, more than
three years after the options backdating scandal was exposed, executives at only
one-third of the 500 companies where such flagrant activity apparently occurred
had been investigated.52 Only twelve executives were ultimately criminally con-
victed of this illegal activity, with just five of those receiving prison sentences.5 3
As one expert on corporate wrong-doing put it succinctly, "[O]nly a fraction of
corporate executives who manipulate or misrepresent their companies' perfor-
mances get exposed by regulators for such misdeeds."54
D. The Meltdown
Between 2000-2008, in what has been called "an era of rapacious capi-
talists and heedless self-indulgence,"ss the entire financial system became de-
pendent on a credit bubble based on shaky home loans. After the collapse of
Dot-com stocks, speculative capital turned to the housing market. Almost all the
participants in that credit market were at least willfully ignorant of the fact that
many home borrowers could not afford their mortgages. When the inflated real
estate values supporting those loans disintegrated, they took down long-
established financial firms that had recklessly dealt in myriad derivative forms
of those debts. 7
Regulatory safeguards that might have prevented such improvidence
had been swept away during the previous decades on the theory that they inhi-
52 Mark Maremont, Backdating Likely More Widespread, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009, at Cl
(citing Rick Edelson & Scott Whisenant, A Study of Companies with Abnormally Favorable
Patterns of Executive Stock Option Grant Timing (Aug. 16, 2009)).
5 Peter Lattman, Prosecutions in Backdating Scandal Bring Mixed Results, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2010, at B5.
54 James A. Kaplan, Why Corporate Fraud Is on the Rise, FORBES.COM, June 10, 2010,
http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/10/corporate-fraud-executive-compensation-personal-finance-
risk-list-2-10-kaplan.html.
5 Frank Rich, The Rabbit Ragu Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at WK8.
56 See generally JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES
(2009); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT (2010); ANDREw Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE
INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
FROM CRISIS AND THEMSELVES (2009).
5 The debacle reached its climax in mid-September 2008. A report stated the situation bluntly:
[G]lobal finance suffered a near-fatal heart attack. In the space of two days
Merrill Lynch fell into the arms of Bank of America (BofA), Lehman went
bust and American International Group (AIG), a mighty insurer, buckled un-
der suicidal derivatives bets and had to be bailed out. Lehman's demise
marked the onset of the worst financial crisis and global recession since the
1930s.
Rearranging the Towers of Gold, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009, at 75, 75.
2012] 539
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bited growth.58 That made private rating agencies, which were supposed to certi-
fy the creditworthiness of those mortgage-backed securities, the only guarantors
of their value. Many of these agencies gave high grades to those financial in-
struments even though they were of doubtful value.59 In doing so they ignored
conclusive evidence that the collateral supporting those loans was as insubstan-
tial as a house of cards.o
After the ensuing collapse, the credit markets froze up, and the whole
economy was thrown into a tailspin, causing wide-spread unemployment. In
response, the government undertook hugely expensive bailout and stimulus
measures, including the nationalization of the auto industry. "The national debt
rose by more than a third over a one-year period, far more than it ever did at
anytime since World War II.",61
As of Fall 2010, no senior financial or investment bank executive had
been successfully prosecuted for any of these events.62 Knowledgeable observ-
ers are alarmed that the federal government has not brought resources to bear in
that effort in the same fashion it does when pursuing organized crime figures.
58 For instance, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
114 Stat. 2763A, added sections 2A and 3A to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act respec-
tively to provide that credit default swaps (CDSs) are not securities. CDSs are a form of insurance
that purchasers of mortgaged backed bonds bought to guarantee their investments against default.
When the market in CDSs grew to $62 trillion in 2007 they were thus completely unregulated and
lacking in transparency. James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle to Save the American Financial
System, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 58. At the time of the meltdown one of the major
issuers of CDSs was the insurance giant AIG that lacked the necessary reserves to make good on
its obligations and had to be bailed out by $180 billion in payments by the U.S. Treasury. Id. at
79. For the author's broader views on how deregulation of the sale of securities has undermined
the stability of the capital markets, see Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking
Securities Regulation and the Case for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 647 (2010).
59 Gretchen Morgenson, Raters Ignored Proof of Unsafe Loans, Panel is Told, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2010, at Bl.
60 As one credit rating analyst wrote in an email about securities backed by subprime mortgag-
es, "Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters." Michael M.
Grynbaum, Study Finds Flawed Practices at Ratings Firms, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at Cl.
61 Floyd Norris, A Rich Uncle Is Picking up the Borrowing Slack, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009,
at B3.
62 See Frank Rich, Editorial, What Happened to Change We Can Believe In?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2010, at WK10 (highlighting that "so many know that the loftiest perpetrators of this national
devastation got get-out-of-jail-free cards").
63 A documentary film on the meltdown that makes that point well is INSIDE JOB (Representa-
tional Pictures 2010) by Charles Ferguson. In a review of the movie, A.O. Scott aptly described
the meltdown as "a crime without punishment." A.O. Scott, Who Maimed the Economy, and How,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at Cl.
The Department of Justice has a task force called Operation Broken Trust which has brought
a number of cases against various financial criminals that one commentator called "small-timers:
penny-stock frauds, a husband-and-wife team charged with insider trading and mini-Ponzi
schemes." Andrew Ross Sorkin, Pulling Back the Curtain on Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010,
at B l. The commentator found that many top corporate officials were unaware of that, stating,
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The lone criminal action so far involving allegations of fraud and insider trading
in mortgaged-back securities resulted in an acquittal. 4
State officials by contrast have had some success in redressing wrongs
from the meltdown. The Attorney General of Ohio for example has "wrested
about $2 billion" in settlements from investment banks, rating agencies, and
"foreclosure scammers[,]" 65 and the Attorney General of Massachusetts secured
a $102 million fine from investment banker Morgan Stanley for knowingly plac-
ing dubious mortgages in securitized pools. 6 6 However, these actions may not
have lasting impact. As one knowledgeable observer commented, "The settle-
ments are large, but the changes in behavior don't seem to be that large....
These targets have massive amounts of money to pay off and continue on their
merry way." 67
E. Dodd-Frank: Addressing the Issues
After a lengthy process that did not conclude until July 2010, almost
two years after the meltdown, Congress finally passed broad-reaching legisla-
tion to address the issues which caused the catastrophe. 6 8 Dodd-Frank contains a
number of provisions designed to forestall profligate speculation and promote
"That's because in the two years since the peak of the financial crisis the government has not
brought one criminal case against a big-time corporate official of any sort." Id.
The Wall Street Journal, however, in an editorial called Operation Broken Trust "good news
for the small investor" went on to say that government prosecutors should not make "arcane cor-
porate accounting cases" a priority because they pose only "theoretical harm to investors." The
Real Bad Guys, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2010, at A18. In the same vein, the editorial went on to state
that options backdating cases should not be a priority for prosecutors. Id.
The Wall Street Journal failed to understand the seriousness of those crimes. Corporate
officials who illegally backdate their company's options are doing the same thing as store manag-
ers who take money out their cash registers and give it to themselves and other employees. Share-
holders in those situations are cheated out of the full revenue their corporations would receive if
those shares were sold at their fair market value. For the author's full perspective on that, see
Morrissey, Path of Corporate Law, supra note 40.
In addition, companies that publish false financial statements typically mislead investors
into paying more for shares than their true value. See discussion infra Part III.B. Investors are
defrauded by this dishonest conduct, and it should be vigorously prosecuted.
6 William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., How the Scapegoats Escaped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at
A35.
65 Michael Powell, The States v. Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010, at Bl.
66 Aaron Lucchetti & Brett Philbin, Morgan Stanley Pays for Subprime, WALL ST. J., June 25,
2010, at C3; Powell, supra note 65.
67 Powell, supra note 65.
68 The author drafted one of the initial versions of a provision in the Act that grants investors a
direct cause of action against credit rating agencies that give unjustifiably high marks to financial
instruments. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 933, 124 Stat. 1376, 1883-84 (2010). For a
good general discussion of this legislation, see DAVID SKEEL, THE NEw FINANCIAL DEAL (2011).
2012] 541
11
Morrissey: Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
financial stability. Most importantly, it establishes an oversight council of regu-
lators charged with monitoring the soundness of the entire economy. 69
Dodd-Frank also creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to
safeguard the public against abusive credit practices, and it mandates that the
details of financial derivatives, like collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs")
and credit default swaps ("CDSs") be transparent.70 Securities like CDOs, where
speculative mortgages were packaged for sale to investors and CDSs, the con-
tracts that were supposed to insure the CDOs, will now be open to public scruti-
ny.
In addition, Dodd-Frank puts restrictions on Wall Street firms who
would use their depositors' money for proprietary trading. In an improvident
move that contributed to the collapse of those firms, the SEC lessened the
amount the firms were required to hold in reserve against such speculation.7 1
Dodd-Frank now restores limits on that leveraging so that government-
guaranteed funds will not be put at risk for those losses. 72 Dodd-Frank also
gives the SEC new regulatory power over hedge funds73 and protects investors
by tightening up the Regulation D exemption to the requirement that securities
first be registered before they can be sold to the public.74
Unfortunately though, much of the legislation's effect is uncertain. The
two major agencies that it creates, the Oversight Council and the Bureau of
Consumer Finance Protection, have only generalized mandates, and almost all
Dodd-Frank's impact in the securities area will depend on rules enacted by the
SEC. 75 As one noted political commentator therefore put it, it is "a financial
regulation bill that still needs to be interpreted by regulators because no one
could agree on crucial provisions."76 In addition, powerful interests are set to
69 Dodd-Frank §§ 111-123. This board, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, has recently
proposed a rule that would impose stricter regulation of large financial companies that are not
banks, such as insurance companies, hedge funds and asset managers. Edward Wyatt, Fed Over-
sight ofNonbanks Is Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at Bl.
70 Dodd-Frank §§ 721-774.
71 See Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al.
72 This is the so-called Volcker rule. It allows banks to invest up to three percent of their tier- 1
capital in private equity and hedge funds, but they cannot own more than three percent of any of
those entities. Dodd-Frank § 614. The Treasury Department has recently released a 298-page
proposal to implement that. Scott Patterson & Alan Zibel, Putting the Clamps on Banks, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 12, 2011, at C1.
73 Dodd-Frank §§ 401-419.
74 Dodd-Frank § 413.
7 See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Volcker on His 'Rule' - Keep It Broad, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
2010, at Cl (describing how former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker is seeking to influ-
ence the provision of Dodd-Frank that bears his name which restricts investment by banks). See
generally DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1-6 (3d ed. 2011) (forthcoming).
76 Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Third Party Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at WK8.
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oppose much of the law's mandates. The president of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce recently "called [Dodd-Frank] a 'regulatory tsunami' that represents
'the biggest single challenge to jobs. . . . and the future of American enter-
prise."' 7 7
Dodd-Frank also attempts to reinvigorate the Commission by doubling
its budget over five years and giving increased incentives for whistleblowers to
come forward with inside information about corporate corruption. 78 Planning to
use that funding increase, SEC chair Mary Schapiro announced that the SEC
will hire 800 new lawyers. 79 Dodd-Frank also charges the Commission to under-
take a host of initiatives that include studies and extensive rule-making in vari-
ous areas of financial regulations.80
Congress, however, has yet to appropriate funds for those endeavors,
stifling not only the Commission's hiring of new personnel, but also handicap-
ping its ability to carry out its basic responsibilities. "Operating under [the cur-
rent budget] is already forcing the agency to delay or cut back enforcement and
market oversight efforts," SEC spokesperson John Nester told the press in early
January 2011.81 Because of this lack of funding, the Commission has also had to
delay the creation of a number of new offices mandated by Dodd-Frank.82
Nevertheless, by September 2011, the Commission had proposed or adopted
rules for approximately three-quarters of the 90 provisions in Dodd-Frank that
required SEC rule-making.83
In addition, the Commission has to recover from some very unfortunate
recent history.84 To its credit, the SEC produced a 477-page report detailing its
7 Mark Schoeff, Jr., Chamber President Seeks to Slow Dodd-Frank, Decries 'Regulatory
Tsunami,' INV. NEWS, Jan. 11, 2011,
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110111/FREE/i10119983. For more on the lobbying
efforts of American business and financial groups to undermine Dodd-Frank, see Ben Protess,
Wall Street Lobbyist Aims To 'Reform the Reform,' N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2011,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/wall-street-lobbyists-try-to-reform-the-reform/.
78 Dodd-Frank §§ 921-929Z.
7 See Riley, supra note 50.
80 Dodd-Frank §§ 911-919D.
81 Riley, supra note 50.
82 Id. SEC chair Mary L. Schapiro made this statement on February 4, 2011, about the Com-
mission's financial woes: "It is a strain that is already having an impact on our core mission -
separate and apart from the new responsibilities that Congress gave us to regulate derivatives,
hedge fund advisers and credit rating agencies[.]" Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall St. Aids S.E.C. Case
for Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at Bl. The author echoed those comments in Morrissey,
supra note 50. As part of the budget compromise in April 2011, Congress refunded the SEC with
a modest increase, but not nearly enough to implement the Dodd-Frank reforms. Mark Schoeff,
Jr., SEC Obtains Modest Budget Bump in Fiscal 2011, INv. NEWS, Apr. 12, 2011,
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110412/FREE/ 10419976.
83 SEC, Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act-
Accomplishments, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/accomplishments.shtml (last modified
Oct. 12, 2011).
84 See Burrows, supra note 51.
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failings in the Madoff matter,85 and that painful self-examination may be gene-
rating some improvements in its operations. A new team of dedicated attorneys
appears to have taken over the Commission's enforcement responsibilities and
has streamlined those procedures.86 For example, the SEC initiated a high-
profile action against Goldman-Sachs in April 2010 for double-dealing in the
derivative market. This action resulted in the prominent investment bank paying
a significant fine, and an admission that its marketing materials contained "in-
complete information" about its conflict of interest in those transactions.
Yet some of the telling criticisms made about the SEC in post-Madoff
investigations may be hard to remedy. Chief among them is the perennial prob-
lem that government attorneys, especially those handling sophisticated matters
like SEC lawyers, never receive anywhere near the compensation of their coun-
terparts in private law firms. One of the Commission's chief detractors during
its examinations by Congress was Harry Markopolos, a securities analyst who
furmished credible information to the SEC for years about Madoff's wrong-
doing yet was unable to get the Commission to take action. In testimony he ex-
pressed these continuing misgivings about the Commission "Right now there is
no accountability in government . . . [and] [t]he problem is that the SEC pays
peanuts and then wonders how it ended up with so many monkeys."88
In fact, things may get worse in that regard. The "Pledge to America"
published by Republican candidates anticipating control of Congress promise to
freeze the pay of federal employees, 89 President Obama acquiesced, announcing
after the 2010 mid-term elections that there would be no raises for most federal
workers for two years. 90 Such action may also compound the deficiencies in the
criminal prosecution of securities fraud where the only action by Justice De-
partment attorneys so far resulting from the meltdown was unsuccessful. 91
85 SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT No. 01G-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE
SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME (2009).
86 Jenny Anderson & Zachery Kouwe, The Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at Bl. The
Commission has new technological procedures to process complaints about securities fraud. Su-
zanne Barlyn, SEC Streamlines Its Tips Process, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at C3. According to
Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, "It's to allow us to better analyze and
prioritize our resources in a context of risk, so that we can better figure out where to put our ef-
forts first." Id.
87 Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime
CDO, Release No. 2010-123 (July 15, 2010).
88 Oversight of the SEC's Failure to Identify the Bernard L. Madoff Ponzi Scheme and How To
Improve SEC Performance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 4-5 (2009) (written testimony of Harry Markopolos, Chartered Financial Analyst,
Certified Fraud Examiner).
89 REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS, A PLEDGE TO AMERICA, available at http://pledge.gop.gov/ (last
visited Nov. 3, 2011).
90 Peter Baker & Jackie Calmes, Obama Declares Two-Year Freeze on Federal Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at Al.
9 See Lattman, supra note 53.
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Further, future activity by the judicial branch may diminish the power
of regulatory agencies like the SEC even more. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub-
lic Co. Accounting Oversight Board,92 decided in June 2010, the Supreme Court
invalidated the provision of Sarbanes-Oxley allowing for removal of members
of a federal panel set up to oversee the accounting profession. The Court rea-
soned that its members could be removed by the SEC, not the president. In dis-
sent, Justice Stephen Breyer warned that precedent could jeopardize the authori-
ty of thousands of federal regulators. 93
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES
Due to those concerns with the impact of Dodd-Frank and the chal-
lenges facing the SEC, it is vital that shareholders have effective remedies. This
section explores not only the need for effective investor actions, but also the
mechanisms shareholders may use to curb and rectify fraudulent activity, specif-
ically class actions and derivative suits. This section will first describe those two
actions and discuss their meritorious qualities. It will then explain why their
alleged deficiencies lack substance and are insignificant when balanced against
the benefits they provide for society. The section will conclude by proposing
legislative reforms to counter several Supreme Court decisions that inhibit the
ability of investors to maintain those suits.
A. The Need for Effective Investor Actions
It is hoped that the array of reforms enacted in Dodd-Frank 9 4 Will pre-
vent some of the corrupt and speculative practices that brought about the dis-
astrous collapse of our economy. 9 However, it is hard to see how they can curb
even a substantial minority of the myriad fraudulent activities that are endemic
in our financial and commercial communities. Strong laws attacking that
wrongdoing have existed since the securities reforms of the 1930s, and new
ones were passed to re-enforce them in the FCPA legislation of 1977 and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Yet, those entrusted with other people's money
have continued to find ways to cheat them. 96
92 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
93 Id. at 3164; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 2010, at
34-35. The current Supreme Court is also seen as the most pro-business in recent memory. See,
e.g., Roger Parloff, On History's Stage: ChiefJustice John Roberts, Jr., FORTUNE, Jan. 17, 2011,
at 63.
94 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
95 See discussion supra Part II.D.
9 The classic work there, now almost 100 years old, is Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1914). More recently, William R. McLucas, the former
Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, testified in front of Congress, stating "the abso-
lute certainty that persons seeking to perpetuate financial fraud will always be among us." Private
Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S.
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However needed the legislative reforms may be, the Dodd-Frank's re-
forms and the administrative measures that will come from them will not lessen
society's need to deter and punish corrupt business practices. In particular, the
mandatory disclosure requirements which have been the heart of the federal
securities laws since the 1930s are vital to underwriting the honesty of the entire
United States economy.9 7 Adequate sanctions must thus be available to make
sure that the disclosures are strictly observed.
Fraudulent corporate reports and financial statements should therefore
receive, in the words of a renowned jurist, "a formal and solemn pronouncement
of the moral condemnation of the community."9 And those who publish them
must be meted out unpleasant consequences" for their harmful conduct. As the
Supreme Court put it in the recent Stoneridge case, "a dynamic, free economy
presupposes a high degree of integrity in all of its parts, an integrity that must be
underwritten by rules enforceable in fair, independent, accessible courts."100
Just a year earlier, in 2007, the Supreme Court noted the importance of
shareholder suits to police corrupt corporate activity. "The Court has long rec-
ognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities
laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement
actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC)." 01 Noted commentators have also pointed to
the important role that such suits serve in deterring corporate fraud. 10 2
Even when it had a sterling reputation as the "Cops of Wall Street," the
SEC itself readily admitted that it could prosecute only a small percentage of
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 280 (1993). The evidence indicates that
investment fraud is particularly wide-spread among the elderly. See For Seniors, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov./investor/seniors.shtml (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (providing special informa-
tion for seniors). In a 2006 study, the SEC reported the astounding finding that "approximately 5
million senior citizens [are] victims of financial abuse and fraud each year." SEC, Investor Alert,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/seniors/elderfraud.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). On small inves-
tors' loss of faith in the integrity of the stock market, see E.S. Browning, Small Investors Flee
Stocks, Changing Market Dynamics, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2010, at Al.
97 Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's
"Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's
Authority, " 108 HARV. L. REv. 438, 455 (1994).
98 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
(1958).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 161.
101 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). The Supreme Court
has made similar statements several times earlier recognizing that private securities actions are a
"necessary supplement" to government action. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gi-
lertson, 501 U.S. 350, 376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.
v. Bemer, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
102 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv.
1465, 1502-04 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1547-56 (2006).
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securities frauds. 103 Citing "the continued growth in the size and complexity of
our securities markets,"l04 the Director of its Enforcement Division welcomed
efforts by private litigators to pick up the slack. He also noted that private suits
provide more complete remedies for shareholders than the SEC's actions be-
cause they "enable defrauded investors to seek compensatory damages and the-
reby recover the full amount of their losses."'0o
The need for such actions is even more pronounced now in light of the
SEC's recent, unfortunate history.106 Even though the Commission has owned
up to its embarrassing short-comings and is attempting to rectify them, 07 public
investors can hardly be re-assured that the Commission will be adequately pro-
tecting their interests. Consequently, the two major mechanisms that give share-
holders viable remedies for fraud-class action suits and derivative actions-are
needed now more than ever.
B. Class Actions: The Investor's Best Friend
In the mid-1960s the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to
allow individual plaintiffs, such as small shareholders, to aggregate their
claims. os That made the class action a marvelous weapon to police corporate
fraud. One well-regarded corporate scholar has given this fitting description of
how it can be put to that use.
Where the single claimant could not proceed individually be-
cause her expenses would dwarf the expected recover, the class
action can be brought on behalf of all who are similarly
situated. And the sheer size of the aggregated claim attracts not
only the entrepreneurial instincts of the class action lawyer but
also commands the full attention of the defendant. The class
action thereby has an important deterrent feature which give it a
quasi-public character; it can thus be seen as an extension of the
state's enforcement arm and an expression of society's will. 109
103 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
104 Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 96.
105 Id. The amounts recovered for defrauded investors in private class actions far outstrip
awards secured by SEC actions. For instance in 2000, amounts collected in private actions were
$4.9 billion, compared to just $488 million in SEC proceedings. DILLON & CANNON, supra note
27, at 347. In 2001 the figures were $1.9 billion garnered for investors from private suits versus
only $522 million recovered by the SEC. Id
106 See Burrows, supra note 51.
107 See SEC, supra note 85.
108 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
109 James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 497
(1997). Another leading authority made much the same point:
2012] 547
17
Morrissey: Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In 1988, the Supreme Court gave added impetus to this remedy with a
decision, accepting the "fraud on the market" theory to show that false corporate
information causes investors' losses.1 10 It assumes that share purchasers can rely
on a stock's market price as reflecting its true worth. When that is skewed be-
cause of misleading information, buyers then suffer losses caused by those
falsehoods and have a commonly provable claim for damages. All of those in-
vestors can therefore be certified as a class without showing that they indivi-
dually took the untruthful information into account in buying their stock.
The "fraud on the market" theory thus presumes that all purchasers of
stock in companies that have published material falsehoods are victimized by
paying distorted values for their shares. The typical situation involves falsely
optimistic information that inflates the worth of a stock. When the truth comes
out, share prices will drop, and the resulting losses can be combined to measure
the damages of all the class members. In a heavily-traded stock, that amount can
be quite large.
Consequently, settlements in these cases during the last two decades
have totaled in the tens of billions of dollars."' Major examples were Enron
($7.1 billion); WorldCom, Inc. ($6.1 billion); and Cendant ($3.5 billion).1 2 One
of the foremost law firms that specialized in these actions sued hundreds of pub-
lic companies and secured recoveries of more than $45 billion." 3 Defendants
found liable in those proceedings included not only the corporations themselves,
but also the officers and directors of those companies and investment banking
firms that underwrote their public offerings. In WorldCom, for instance, former
directors contributed $55 million to the settlement.114
Given such results, it is hardly surprising that those actions provoked
considerable hostility from the business community. Many were said to be fri-
volous "strike suits": cases with flimsy evidence brought only to extract a quick
settlement from harassed corporate defendants."' Lawmakers responded to
Securities class actions have an appealing attraction to those seeking to deter
fraud. If a party commits fraud that affects hundreds, if not thousands of dis-
persed shareholders, allowing a plaintiffs' attorney to aggregate the claims in-
to a single class action makes the pursuit of such claims both more managea-
ble and economical.
Choi, supra note 102, at 1522.
110 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
I' See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,
2009 Wis. L. REv. 151 (2009).
112 DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS
396 (2d ed. 2008).
113 DILLON & CANNON, supra note 27, at 2.
114 NAGY ET. AL., supra note 112, at 396-97.
115 The notion that many of these suits were "vexatious litigation" even started appearing in
Supreme Court decisions that cut back the reach of substantive claims under the federal securities
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those concerns, but not as some had urged by eliminating the federal causes of
action for securities fraud"' 6 or over-ruling the "fraud on the market" theory that
made them economically viable." 7
Instead, Congress took a more measured approach by enacting amend-
ments to the securities laws in 1995, such as the Public Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA"),"' which merely required a higher initial showing that
such actions were meritorious. In suits under the implied cause of action of Rule
lOb-5,"l9 Congress, among other things, required that fraud be pled with particu-
larity,120 and prohibiting discovery'21 until plaintiffs could demonstrate by a
"strong inference"l 2 2 that the defendants acted with the requisite state of
d. 123
In addition, the amendments required that courts overseeing such litiga-
tion appoint lead counsel for plaintiffs based on considerations that would as-
sure that the largest investors would control the suit.124 Among other things, it
also included a requirement that plaintiffs show that their losses were actually
caused by the misleading statements.125
116 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights ofAction Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARv. L. REV. 961 (1994).
117 NAGY ET AL., supra note 112, at 397.
" Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). This legislation amended the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act by adding new sections 27A and 21D, respectively.
119 Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). See also discussion infra Part
V.C.
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006). The Supreme
Court recently held that class action plaintiffs met the PSLRA's pleading standards by alleging
that certain statements made by a pharmaceutical company were materially misleading because of
a possible link between one of its products and a nasal disorder. Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano,
131 S. Ct. 1309, 1313 (2011).
121 Consequently, PSLRA added sections 27(b) to the Securities Act and 21D(b)(3) to the Ex-
change Act.
122 Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2). See also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 314 (2007) (holding such a standard would be satisfied if the pleading was "cogent").
123 An implied cause of action under Rule lOb-5 requires a showing of scienter. See discussion
infra Parts V.C.-D.
124 To provide this, PSLRA added sections 27(a)(3) to the Securities Act and 21D(a)(3) to the
Exchange Act. In 1998, Congress preempted class action suits for securities fraud in state courts
by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Consequently, this made the
restrictive provisions of the PSLRA applicable to all such suits. Id
125 Exchange Act § 211D(b)(4). In Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff need not prove loss causation at the class certification stage of the litiga-
tion. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
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C. Derivative Suits: Keeping Management Honest
The other major weapon for shareholders seeking redress against corpo-
rate wrongdoing is the derivative suit. In the mid-19th century, equity courts in
England began allowing shareholders to hold managers of their companies lia-
ble for breaches of their fiduciary duties. 126 This process, as it has evolved, con-
sists of two separate causes of actions. The first is a suit by shareholders against
their corporation for failing to pursue its rights against the malefactors. The
second authorizes stockholders to then maintain a claim on behalf of their com-
pany against those officials.127
About that time, American courts also began to recognize derivative
suits, although the Supreme Court conditioned them upon a requirement that
acknowledged the board's prerogative to manage the corporation's affairs.128
Before initiating the suit, the shareholders first had either to make demand on
the directors themselves to bring it or to show why that request would be futile.
Although some states now require that stockholders always take this preliminary
step of making demand on the board,129 many, like the leading jurisdiction of
Delaware,130 will excuse it if the directors are so interested in the questioned
transaction that they lack the independence to make that judgment.
In the twentieth century, the derivative suit thus became what the Su-
preme Court called, "the chief regulator of corporate management."1 31 As one
commentator put it succinctly, it was a "needed policeman" 32 to hold officers
and directors accountable for breaches of their fiduciary duties. Another leading
jurist praised the action's virtues saying, "[I]t is recognized that while minority
corporate members are often actuated by selfish interests, they are sometimes
useful gadflies which become the most effective instruments for ferreting out
wrongdoing, for pursuing it publicly and for giving point to the only sanctions
actual and potential wrongdoers fear." 33
Over the last several decades, however, it seemed that this great tool of
reform had become eclipsed by shareholder class actions and other remedies
126 See Bert S. Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 980, 980 (1957) (pointing out that the derivative suit originated in the 1843 English case
Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189).
127 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). For an earlier article by the author on aspects of the
derivative suit, see Daniel J. Morrissey, New Rulings Threaten the Derivative Suit-Will the
"Needed Policeman" Keep Walking the Beat?, 36 S.C. L. REv. 631 (1985).
128 Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
129 See 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1994); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.42
(1984).
130 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; In re F5 Networks, Inc., 207 P.3d 433 (Wash. 2009).
'13 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
132 Daniel J. Dykstra, The Revival ofthe Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 78 (1967).
133 Pomerantz v. Clark, 101 F. Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. 1951) (Wyzanski, J.).
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that offered stronger potential to redress offensive corporate behavior. 134 De-
rivative suits were, therefore, virtually ignored in legal scholarship where the
more high-profile class actions got all the attention.' 35 Supporting that neglect
was an old complaint that derivative suits were only motivated by "the hope of
handsome fees to be recovered by plaintiffs' counsel" 36 and achieved little real
substance for shareholders.13 7
Originally, derivative suits produced a monetary recovery for the corpo-
ration, 1 but courts gradually accepted that substantial non-financial benefits
such as therapeutic changes in a corporation's governance structure would also
justify the payment of attorneys' fees. 3 9 That brought charges that such reforms
produced little real benefit for shareholders.14 0
A recent study echoes that criticism, albeit with some ambivalence. It
also reports that "contrary to the conventional wisdom, shareholder derivative
suits are anything but dead. Shareholders actually file more shareholder deriva-
tive suits than securities class actions . . . .,"14 Despite some misgivings, the
author there also lauds all the good derivative suits have done in making corpo-
rate managers attentive to their fiduciary duties.142
In the same vein, a recent observer made this insightful comment about
certain landmark derivative cases: "These decisions changed the rules for future
legal practice by allowing well-motivated legal counselors to get their clients to
accept better conduct and procedures. Moreover, derivative suits against private
companies perform an important, if less heralded, role in policing conflict of
interest transactions and duty of care violations." 4 3 Another commentator put it
'34 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REv. 387
(2008).
135 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 111.
136 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. §
33-724 (2010). However, the court in Joy approved of the derivative suit saying, "[t]he derivative
action is the common law's inventive solution to the problem of actions to protect shareholder
interests[,]" and "[t]he derivative action constitutes a major legal bulwark against managerial self-
dealing." Id. (citing CARY AND EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 938 (5th ed.
1980)).
'3n Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55, 65, 84 (1991).
'3 See, e.g., Giesecke v. Pittsburgh Hotels, Inc., 180 F.2d 65 (3d Cir. 1950).
13 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw 446 (2d ed. 2010).
140 Romano, supra note 137.
141 Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1749, 1754 (2010).
142 Id. at 1829.
143 Robert B. Thompson, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Law Suits, 57 VAND. L.
REv. 1747, 1749 (2004).
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even more succinctly, "We cannot dispense with the derivative suit without
doing absolutely irreparable damage to our corporate governance system."1 4 4
IV. THE ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS OF SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS AND
DERIVATIVE SUITS
This section addresses these supposed deficiencies of shareholder class
actions and derivative suits: "Pocket-Shifting" problems, "Circularity" prob-
lems, and the role of the plaintiff in derivative suits. It then responds to those
charges and refutes them.
A. The Pocket-Shifting Problem
Despite the demonstrated need for these actions some commentators
have claimed they are superfluous because they provide little real compensation
for defrauded shareholders. This is particularly true, they say, because of "Pock-
et-Shifting" problems,145 which occur when corporate defendants have not sold
securities themselves 46 but are liable because their officials have either con-
cealed bad news or in other ways misrepresented the profitability of their com-
panies.147 When the true facts are revealed, the stock prices of those firms typi-
cally drop back to their real value undistorted by the falsely positive news. In-
vestors who have purchased shares at such wrongfully inflated prices therefore
suffer losses.148
According to these critics, "Pocket-Shifting" problems then arise be-
cause corporate defendants and their officials almost always settle them either
with the companies' funds or with payments provided by insurance policies
taken out against such liability.149 Since premiums on those come from the cor-
poration, the shareholders' own money is directly or indirectly paying their
claims-not funds from the corporate officials responsible for the wrongdoing.
According to the opponent of these suits, the plaintiffs' lawyers and the insur-
14 Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 131, 143 (2000).
145 Three well-respected corporate scholars have recently written about this problem. Richard
A. Booth, The Future of Securities Litigation, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 129 (2009); Coffee, supra note
102; Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives, "Naked, Homeless and Without
Wheels ": Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and The Debate over Entity Versus Individual
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007).
146 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do
Not Trade?, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 297 (concluding that substantial reasons exist for using a civil-
liability scheme for enforcing mandatory disclosure).
147 For comments on how American corporate culture seems to encourage this type of false
optimism that misleads shareholders, see Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-
Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 639, 656 (1996).
148 Booth, supra note 145, at 136-38.
149 Coffee, supra note 102, at 1549-51.
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ance companies are therefore the real players here.150 They profit by the fees
they reap from these actions 51 even though the settlements they reach often do
not extract penalties from the true fraudsters-the corporate officials who have
caused their firms to make false statements.15 2
Those critics, however, fail to take into account the important role that
enterprise liability plays in our jurisprudence to deter and punish harmful busi-
ness activity.' As Professor Cox has observed, there is a longstanding common
law tradition and much academic support for the principle that businesses
should pay for the wrongdoing of their employees.154 No less a venerable legal
rule than respondeat superior is premised on the notion that a principal should
be directly liable for its agent's performance. 156
As the Supreme Court has also recently re-emphasized,' 5 7 corporations
are legal entities with much the same rights and privileges as natural persons. As
such they have corresponding legal responsibilities. Since corporations can only
act through their officers and directors, fraud that those officials commit in their
representative roles must be deemed wrongful acts by the artificial bodies that
they run. Corporations are therefore not held liable unless at least one natural
person who works for them is culpable. 58
One obvious goal then of shareholders suits is to stop wrongful conduct
by corporate officials. This deterrent purpose has long been endorsed by courts
who have hailed lawyers in these actions as "private attorney generals" supple-
menting government enforcement of the securities laws.15 9 A recent commenta-
tor has argued that private actions might even be seen as the principal mechan-
150 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1499 (1996).
151 Legal fees on both sides in these matters have averaged about $2.5 billion per year in recent
years. Fox, supra note 146, at 306-07.
152 Coffee, supra note 102, at 1550-51.
153 Professor Langevoort notes that there is strong federal support of enterprise liability. Lange-
voort, supra note 145, at 631 (citing Robert Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Cor-
porate Governance: Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 865 (2003)).
Langevoort believes that enterprise liability does have a positive effect deterring corporate
fraud but expresses skepticism because its efficacy is tempered by the historical reluctance of
outside directors to monitor wrongful activity by corporate officers. Id at 636.
154 Cox, supra note 109, at 511.
1ss RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §2.04 (2006); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, & LLCs 71-73 (2004).
156 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 155, at 71-73.
15 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
158 Langevoort, supra note 147, at 653.
159 That term was first coined by the distinguished jurist Jerome Frank in Associated Industries
ofNew York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707
(1943). It was later cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in a specific reference to




Morrissey: Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW
ism to police securities fraud, constituting a governmental "outsourcing" of that
important function. Among the benefits from these multiple and varied private
litigators are innovative arguments to address the "changing circumstances" of
securities fraud. 60
In the same vein, these suits should also make those ultimately in charge
of corporations take action against their culpable officials to make sure such
harmful conduct does not occur again. Professor Cox suggests that outsider di-
rectors and audit committees take control of corrupt corporations to reform their
practices and discipline management guilty of such frauds. 16 1 Others like Pro-
fessor Langevoort are skeptical that these suits will result in corporations taking
action against their wrongdoing officials because of the close ties boards tradi-
tionally have with the officers of their companies. 162
Yet, if that is the case, the shareholders themselves can step in and take
further action against the wrongdoers. As a recent commentator has argued,
stockholders are the true owners of their companies and therefore not mere in-
nocent victims of such wrongdoing.163 As such, it is not unjust that the damages
in these class actions should come from shareholder funds and such awards can
awaken them to their proprietary responsibilities. A response like that goes well
with recent movement in increased stockholder activism. The SEC's new rule
giving shareholders the right to nominate directors should accelerate that
trend. 16
Shareholders also have another effective tool to pursue such recalcitrant
directors-the derivative suit. As this Article has discussed, a stockholder may
bring such an action on behalf of the corporation against officers and directors
who have harmed it by requiring them to pay damages for those frauds.16 5 Even
Professor Booth, who is generally quite negative on shareholder class actions,
160 Fox, supra note 146, at 329-31.
161 Cox, supra note 109, at 511-12.
162 Langevoort, supra note 145, at 636; accord Corporate Boards: The Way We Govern Now,
THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 59, available at http://www.economist.com/node/1533377 (last
visited Oct. 22, 2011) (asserting that "[t]oo many boards are stuffed with yes men who question
little that their chief executives suggest").
163 Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and Deter-
rence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 243, 253, 273-87 (2009).
164 SEC, SEC Adopts New Measure to Facilitate Director Nomination by Shareholders, Re-
lease 2010-155, Aug. 25, 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm
(last modified Aug. 8, 2010). However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
invalidated that rule because the Commission had failed to consider its effect upon efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (2d Cir. 2011). The
SEC has determined not to appeal that decision as of October 22, 2011.
The Supreme Court recently indicated its support for "the procedures of corporate democra-
cy" by citing it as a mechanism whereby dissenting shareholders might correct misuse of their
funds for corporate political speech. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (citing First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978).
165 See supra text accompanying note 126.
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proposes that courts should turn them into derivative suits so that a corporation
may recover from its insiders for the harm they have caused it and its sharehold-
166
ers.
The potential for attorneys' fees that such suits hold would therefore en-
courage shareholder lawyers to follow up and make sure the real wrongdoers are
punished-blending class actions and derivative suits into an effective "one-
two" punch against corporate corruption. Professor Coffee adds the helpful sug-
gestion that plaintiffs' lawyers could then be rewarded with bonuses based on
the source of the settlements (from corporate insiders) and not simply on their
167size.
In addition, insurance companies who are facing a crisis because of
claims for such fraud,168 should have every incentive to be stem with their cor-
porate policyholders and threaten to rescind their coverage unless such corrupt
activity is curtailed. This re-enforces the importance of enterprise liability where
the availability of insurance helps to deter harm.16 9 Insurance companies are
profitable of course if they successfully manage risk. 170 That gives them the
incentive to make sure their corporate policy holders do not incur liability. Such
self-interest, Professor Coffee notes, serves the same function that independent
directors should play to police management and vigilantly assure that corpora-
tions are not injured by fraud.17 1
B. The Circularity Issue
"Circularity" problems are also said to undercut the effectiveness of
shareholder class actions. In the typical situation of securities fraud, an investor
buys a stock that is overvalued because of deceitful actions by a company's of-
ficials thereby paying too much for it. Correspondingly, the shareholder on the
other side of the transaction who sells her stock to that purchaser receives an
unjustified gain. Since such a seller is usually innocent of the falsehood, she gets
to keep her windfall.
It can be presumed, however, that many parties in these transactions
hold diversified portfolios or invest indirectly through firms that do such as mu-
166 Booth, supra note 145, at 144-46.
167 Coffee, supra note 102, at 1581-82.
168 Id. at 1580-81.
169 Enterprise liability, as it has developed in the classic doctrine of respondeat superior, is
predicated in part on an employer's ability to spread the risk of loss caused by its employees
through insurance and in part on the employer's ability to control their conduct. Steven A. Fish-
man, Inherent Agency Power-Should Enterprise Liability Apply to Agents' Unauthorized Con-
tracts?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 48-49 (1987); see supra text accompanying note 153.
170 Professor Cox notes this truism in discussing the role that insurance plays justifying enter-
prise liability. Cox, supra note 109, at 513.
171 Coffee, supra note 102, at 1580-81.
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tual funds.172 Consequently, investors will "win some and lose some" in these
fraud situations, with their gains and losses "washing out" over time.173 Legal
fees and transaction costs in these suits are thereby said to bring net losses to
these diversified investors in the same way that they also decrease the wealth of
shareholders in "Pocket-Shifting" situations. Some critics therefore argue that
shareholder class actions produce no real gains for most investors but ultimately
cost them money.17 4
This "Circularity" analysis of course does not apply to the simple share-
holder with an unvaried portfolio who buys a particular stock at a falsely in-
flated price.' She is injured by such wrongdoing and deserves recompense.17 6
Yet the losses of just one such individual are usually not sufficient to motivate
an attorney to bring an action on her behalf. The possibility of aggregating them
with like claims however can provide such an incentive, regardless of the diver-
sified status of those other investors. 177
In addition, this "Circularity" argument is a fairly cynical "no-harm, no-
foul" approach that does not take into account the important role these suits play
in guaranteeing the integrity of the securities market. As Holmes put it so well,
if we are to understand the role of law, we must look at it as a "bad man ...
wishing to avoid an encounter with the public force. ... " Such civil suits are
the only real sanctions that most of these corporate wrong-doers fear.179 Elimi-
nating them would only embolden fraudsters, making investment a "rigged
game" and thereby causing potential share purchasers to be reluctant to commit
their capital to businesses.
172 Id. at 1559.
17 Booth, supra note 145, at 139-40.
174 Professor Booth strongly asserts this, citing the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital
Market Regulation published by the Treasury Department under the leadership of Secretary Henry
Paulson. Id. at 143; COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 72 (2006), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30CommitteeInterimReportREV.pdf. (last visited Oct. 22,
2011).
175 As Professor Langevoort notes while discussing "Pocket-Shifting" and "Circularity" issues
that may detract from fraud recoveries, "That does not mean that the unfortunate victims do not
deserve compensation.... [N]ot all investors are active or diversified, and bad luck as a result of
corporate fraud will predictably befall even some who are, in ways that are not washed away."
Langevoort, supra note 145, at 632, 634.
176 Professor Coffee, however, points out that many times these undiversified investors "buy
and hold" stocks and therefore are more likely to have purchased their shares before the class
period begins. This not only makes them ineligible to be plaintiffs but puts them at a disadvantage
over the "in and out" traders who are more likely to be in the plaintiffs' class. Coffee, supra note
102, at 1559-60.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 108-109.
1' OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 170 (1920).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 111- 114.
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Shareholder class actions are rather needed now more than ever to deter
and punish these fraudsters-and to hold them accountable through the publicity
of a law suit.so As Judge Richard Posner, the father of law and economics,
wrote of shareholder class actions, "[T]he most important point, on an economic
analysis, is that the violator be confronted with the costs of his violation - this
achieves the allocative purpose of the suit - not that he pay them to his vic-
,,S:181tims."
Yet as Professor Jill Fisch has recently pointed out,182 disciplining man-
agement to be honest about the values of their companies is not the only benefit
these suits provide.' 83 Investors are protected here not just by a system that
compensates them for their losses, but also by one that rewards them for being
informed traders.184 These suits encourage that activity by providing a mechan-
ism to reimburse such share purchasers when they are deceived in reliance on
falsehoods.'8 Class actions thus facilitate the efficient pricing of securities that
comes with such informed trading, providing "a positive corporate-governance
externality"18 6 that increases the worth of all shares.
In addition, as Professor Coffee rightly points out, if class actions are
replaced by mere civil penalties levied against the wrong-doers, the recovery
will typically be much less than the current settlements of those suits.18 7 Corres-
pondingly, the incentives that plaintiffs' attorneys currently have to discover and
prosecute such frauds will be greatly reduced. Those potential rewards are ne-
cessary because of the large amount of resources that shareholder lawyers must
typically commit to effectively investigate and pursue these legal actions.' 88
Without such inducements, there would be much less investigation and exposure
of corporate wrong-doing.
180 See Choi, supra note 102, at 1524 ("[S]ecurities class actions do hold promise in harnessing
private incentives to police for fraud.").
181 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 349-50 (1972).
182 Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009
Wis. L. REv. 333.
183 Id. at 335.
184 Id.
85 Id. at 347.
186 Id. at 335.
187 Coffee, supra note 102, at 1563-64. For statistics showing how much better private suits are
at recovering losses for defrauded shareholders than SEC actions, see supra text accompanying
note 105.
88 For additional support on that point from the law and economics school, see BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 156, at 365-68; Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169 (1968); see also supra text accompanying notes 109, 174.
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C. Questions About Plaintiffs in Derivative Suits
As has been discussed, the federal securities laws now require that
courts overseeing class action litigation appoint lead plaintiffs to assure that the
largest investors will control the action. 189 No such requirement exists for the
derivative suit. There the plaintiff needs only to have been a shareholder at the
time of the alleged wrong-doing and remain one throughout the litigation. 190 A
plaintiff shareholder in a derivative suit therefore may own just a small fraction
of the outstanding shares. In dismissing such an action, a court recently made
this comment questioning those different standing requirements in class actions
and derivative suits:
In both contexts [shareholder class actions and derivative suits]
there is a need to have plaintiffs who can adequately represent
other shareholders and exercise a meaningful role in critical de-
cisions such as whether to file suit or to settle. Otherwise, it is
the attorneys who will completely control the litigation and
make these decisions based on their own financial interests ra-
ther than the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 91
Remarks such as those misperceive the different functions that share-
holder plaintiffs have in class actions and derivative suits. Unlike stockholders
in class actions who are suing to vindicate their own rights and seek damages
themselves, shareholder plaintiffs in derivative actions are redressing wrongs
done to their companies. Recoveries in those actions inure not to the stockhold-
ers themselves but to their corporations. In class actions, therefore, it may be
appropriate to have shareholders with the largest amount of their personal
wealth at stake serve as lead plaintiffs. They arguably should control the litiga-
tion to safeguard their personal interests. 19 2
But such a mechanism is not needed in derivative suits because the
stockholder plaintiffs there are not looking for a personal recovery. Unlike se-
curities class actions, which are typically brought under federal anti-fraud laws,
derivatives suits usually seek to redress wrongs done by corporate management
whose duties are governed by state law. Standing rules in derivative suits there-
189 See supra text accompanying note 124.
190 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)(1).
191 In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholder Derivative Litig., No. 08 Civ. 974(DLC), 2008
WL 4298588 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008).
192 A recent study however indicates that many large financial institutions have been reluctant
to assume that role and when they have they do not increase the dollar recoveries relative to the
provable losses. Even more importantly, almost all of these lead plaintiffs have not been banks or
mutual funds but rather public or labor pension funds-groups that might be motivated as much to
achieve corporate reforms as by eagerness for remunerative gain. James D. Cox and Randall S.
Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintifs in Securities Class
Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1590 (2006).
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fore just require that the plaintiff be able to "fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the corporation in enforcing the rights of the corporation."l 9 3 Two
leading cases, one from the Supreme Court and the other written by a distin-
guished Delaware Chancellor, cogently explain the wisdom of that jurispru-
dence and demonstrate the paramount role that competent and vigorous counsel
play in these actions.194
D. Surowitz and Fuqua Industries
In the first case, Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,' 95 the plaintiff was an
immigrant with a very limited English vocabulary.19 6 She had saved money she
earned as a seamstress and bought stock in the defendant corporation at the sug-
gestion of her son-in-law, a law school graduate who was also a professional
investment advisor.197 When she received notice that the corporation was repur-
chasing a large amount of its shares she took it to her son-in-law.99 He then
investigated the matter and concluded that officials of the corporation were en-
gaging in a fraudulent scheme.' 99 After the company stopped paying dividends,
Mrs. Surowitz agreed that a derivative suit be filed in her name.200
Upon an oral examination, it became apparent that Mrs. Surowitz knew
little about the specifics of the misconduct alleged in the complaint and had re-
lied on her son-in-law to explain its facts to her. 20 ' The defendants, therefore,
sought dismissal on the grounds that Mrs. Surowitz was not a proper party
plaintiff.202 In a unanimous opinion, however, the Supreme Court allowed the
suit to go forward stating:
[D]erivative suits have played a rather important role in protect-
ing shareholders of corporations from the designing schemes
and wiles of insiders who are willing to betray their company's
interests in order to enrich themselves. And it is not easy to
conceive of anyone more in need of protection against such
schemes than little investors like Mrs. Surowitz. 2 03
'9 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.41(2) (2010).
194 See infra Part 4.D.
1 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
196 Id at 368.
197 Id.
198 Id
199 Id at 369.
200 Id
201 Id. at 372.
202 Id. at 366.
203 Id. at 371.
5592012]
29
Morrissey: Shareholder Litigation After the Meltdown
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2012
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The lower court had considered "a woman like Mrs. Surowitz who is
uneducated generally and illiterate in economic matters" to be unsuitable as a
plaintiff in a derivate suit.2 04 But the Supreme Court would not allow her poten-
tially meritorious action to be sidetracked on those grounds. Rather, it held that
the rules on derivative suits were designed "to administer justice through fair
trials" and "to get away from the old procedural booby traps which common-
law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their
day in court."205
Next, In re Fuqua Industries, Inc. Shareholder Litigation206 contained
similar allegations that its plaintiff shareholders were unfamiliar with many of
the facts alleged in the derivative suit and had little control over it. One of them,
Abrams, with her husband had held substantial shares in the company for a
number of years and had become concerned about managerial misconduct by its
207
officers and directors. The other plaintiff, Freberg, purchased a small number
of shares in the company. 208 Two years later, "presumably upon concluding that
Fuqua directors ... had engaged in self-dealing transactions[,]" 2 0 9 he filed a suit
that was ultimately consolidated with Abrams's complaint. 2 10
During the long pendency of the action, Abrams became ill and the
court found that her memory and faculties suffered as a result. 2 11 When deposed
it was evident that she lacked a full understanding of the particulars of the suit
although at times she appeared able to provide a general understanding of her
claim.212
As to Freberg, the court found "his knowledge of the case is at best el-
liptical." 2 13 The defendants also sought dismissal of Freberg's claim because he
had "a general ignorance of six or seven other lawsuits in which he was, or still
is, the named representative plaintiff." 2 14 The court then summed up the defen-
dants' arguments by commenting "[t]he subtext of the defendants' motion is that
Freberg has no knowledge of this case because he has no real economic interest
at stake. In defendants' view, Freberg is a puppet for his fee-hungry lawyers."2 15
Citing previous Delaware decisions however, Chancellor Chandler re-
sponded:
204 Id. at 372.
205 Id. at 373.
206 752 A.2d 126 (Del. Ch. 1999).
207 Id. at 128.
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[T]he Court of Chancery will not bar a representative plaintiff
from the courthouse for lack of proficiency in matters of law
and finance and poor health so long as he or she has the compe-
tent support from advisors and attorneys and is free from disabl-
ing conflicts. This conclusion is both just and sensible.2 16
He then made these astute comments to refute charges that derivative suits
should be disfavored because lawyers are rewarded for their efforts in bringing
them:
[T]he mere fact that lawyers pursue their own economic inter-
ests in bringing derivative litigation cannot be held as grounds
to disqualify a derivative plaintiff. To do so is to impeach a cor-
nerstone of sound corporate governance. Our legal system has
privatized in part the enforcement mechanism for policing fidu-
ciaries by allowing private attorneys to bring suits on behalf of
nominal shareholder plaintiffs. In so doing, corporations are
safeguarded from fiduciary breaches and shareholders thereby
benefit. Through the use of cost and fee shifting mechanisms,
private attorneys are economically incentivized to perform this
service on behalf of shareholders.2 17
The Chancellor then ruled that the suit should go forward since Freberg
understood the basic nature of the derivative claims brought in his name. 218 As
to his involvement with other litigation, the Chancellor said, "For better or
worse, however, no limit exists on the number of lawsuits one individual can
bring in a lifetime." 2 19 The court likewise found Mrs. Abrams to be a suitable
plaintiff saying, "[1]ike Mrs. Surowitz with the aid of her son-in-law, Mrs. Ab-
rams discovered her injury and filed this lawsuit with the aid of her husband." 2 20
E. The Lawyer/Client Relationship in Derivative Suits
Plaintiffs in derivative cases provide a much needed service to our
economy by being catalysts for corporate reform. As Chancellor Chandler noted
in a post-Fuqua decision, "It is important for shareholders to bring derivative
suits because these suits, filed after the alleged wrongdoing, operate as an ex
post check on corporate behavior." 22 1 That important observation, read together
216 Id. at 131.
217 Id. at 133.
218 Id. at 134.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Seinfeld v. Coker, 847 A.2d 330, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000).
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with Chancellor Chandler's earlier comments in Fuqua, make a compelling case
for the key role of counsel in derivative suits.
Because any recovery in a derivative action goes to the corporation,
plaintiffs there gain only a small, indirect reward for their efforts. As one com-
mentator put it, "Indeed it does not make economic sense for the usual plaintiff
shareholder to bring the [derivative] suit. The individual who gains by bringing
the suit is the shareholder's attorney. The attorney hopes to collect fees out of
any judgment or settlement." 22 2
Courts therefore may have legitimate concerns about the ability of
shareholder plaintiffs in potentially meritorious derivative suits to adequately
represent the interests of their corporations. Derivative suit plaintiffs must not
be mere "puppets" of others, unmotivated to bring the action and uninterested in
it.223 Similar apprehension may exist in shareholder class actions where one
judge feared that plaintiffs might be "nominees, indeed pawns, of the law-
yer." 224
Yet involved, active shareholders like Mrs. Surowitz and the plaintiffs
in Fuqua are to be commended. Their suits not only redress fraudulent corporate
behavior, but also, in the words of Chancellor Chandler, "deter improper beha-
vior by similarly situated directors and managers, who want to avoid the ex-
pense of being sued and the sometimes larger reputational expense of losing in
222 GEVURTZ, supra note 139, at 449. Safeguards exist to make sure that those suits are only
brought when there is a good chance that such a valuable result will occur. First, a shareholder
may not initiate a derivative suit unless a reasonable doubt exists about the ability of the directors
to independently exercise their managerial prerogatives to decide whether the matter should be
pursued. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (holding that directors' lack of independence and disinterest does not excuse
pre-suit demand); see supra text accompanying notes 136-137.
Then, if the case does go forward, the court must approve any settlement to make sure that it
produces appropriate benefits for the corporation. FED. R. Civ. P 23.1(c). One commentator has
recently questioned whether courts adequately review these settlements allowing some which do
not benefit shareholders. Erickson, supra note 141, at 1792-94. Similar review procedures, how-
ever, exist for the settlement of class actions which were strengthened by amendments in 2003.
The advisory committee there noted, "Settlement may be a desirable means of resolving a class
action. But court review and approval are essential to assure adequate representation of class
members who have not participated in shaping the settlement." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory comm.
notes (2003 amendments).
On that point, one experienced judge has recently written:
This Court has ruled upon many applications for final approval of a class ac-
tion settlement . . . . The fact that nearly all of those settlements have been ap-
proved is testament to the fact that class counsel generally do an excellent job
in negotiating settlements which are fair, reasonable and adequate to the entire
class and not just the class representatives.
Hon. David C. Valasquez et al., The Watchdog Role: Determination of Fairness of Proposed
Class Action Settlements, ORANGE CoUNTY LAWYER, Sept. 2007, at 33, 37.
223 See Rogosin v. Steadman, 65 F.R.D. 365, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd on reh'g, Rogosin v.
Steadman, 71 F.R.D. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
224 Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner J.).
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court." 22 5 And to be successful, such shareholders need the assistance of compe-
tent and forceful counsel. As Chancellor Chandler rightly emphasized in Fuqua:
Our legal system has long recognized that lawyers take a domi-
nant role in prosecuting litigation on behalf of clients. A con-
scientious lawyer should indeed take a leadership role and
thrust herself to the fore of a lawsuit. This maxim is particularly
relevant in cases involving fairly abstruse issues of corporate
governance and fiduciary duties.226
V. THE FEDERAL CAUSES OF ACTION FOR SECURITIES FRAUD
The Supreme Court and federal law have dealt devastating blows to
shareholders' potential for recovery. The Court's decisions, compounded with
and enabled by federal law, have watered down the potency of shareholders'
remedies. Congress, however, holds the key to redress and should reinvigorate
the remedies. The following sections of this Article discuss these issues.
A. The Strong Investor Remedy Under Section 11
Effective class actions and derivative suits are thus the principal proce-
dural mechanisms that shareholders can use to bring fraud claims under the fed-
eral securities laws. If such suits are to be appropriate vehicles for redress, how-
ever, those substantive remedies must afford meaningful methods for recovery.
Causes of actions provided in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act can
and should give defrauded investors that ability. Several judicial decisions,
however, have weakened those rights.
The year of the meltdown, 2008, was also the 75th anniversary of the
Securities Act of 1933,227 the key piece of legislation enacted to reform our cap-
ital markets after the disastrous Crash of 1929 that precipitated the Great De-
pression. The Securities Act mandates that before securities can be offered and
sold to the public a registration statement including the issuer's prospectus 228
has to be filed with an overseeing federal commission, the SEC.229
225 Seinfeld, 847 A.2d at 333.
226 In re Fuqua Indus. Inc. Shareholder Litig., 752 A.2d 126, 135 (Del. Ch. 1999).
227 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
228 The SEC has summarized the essential facts that a prospectus must contain in these four
categories: "(1) a description of the company's properties and businesses; (2) a description of the
security to be offered for sale; (3) information about the management of the company; and (4)
financial statements certified by independent accountants." SEC, Registration Under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).
229 Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77c. The author has recently published an article about the
continuing importance of that mandate and the need to strengthen it. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The
Securities Act at its Diamond Jubilee: Reviewing the Case for a Robust Registration Requirement,
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If any information in that document is materially false or misleading,
section 11 of the Act gives investors a right to sue and recover damages directly
from a number of individuals who are connected to the offering. 230 Those de-
fendants can only escape liability if they can establish one of the affirmative
defenses the Act provides. The most significant of those are "due diligence" and
"non-causation." The former generally requires a showing of reasonable inves-
tigation to assure the accuracy of the registration statement. 23 ' The latter bars
liability if the defendants can show that the investors' losses were caused by
something other than the false statements in the registration statement.232
Many parallels have been drawn between the Depression era and our
current economic difficulties that were brought about by the financial melt-
down.2 33 Unfortunately, the stringent registration requirements and the accom-
11 U. PENN. J. Bus L. 749 (2009). For a summary of the process and requirements of securities
registration, see id at 759-62.
A number of foreign companies, many from China, may now be evading this registration
requirement by going public "through the back door." To go "through the back door," foreign
companies first purchase an American shell company which has a stock exchange listing but few
assets. Next, they execute a reverse merger of their firm into that company. And finally, "[a] quick
name change and presto, the Chinese company is traded on Nasdaq or the Amex." James Suro-
wiecki, Don't Enter the Dragon, NEW YORKER, Jan. 31, 2011, at 25.
230 Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (giving the right to sue not only the issuer, but
also everyone who signs the registration statement, the company's directors, and its auditors and
underwriters).
231 Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b). The classic case interpreting that provision is
Escott v. Bar Chris Construction Corp., which allowed defendants to avoid liability if they could
show they met a specific standard of knowledge or conduct with respect to the material misstate-
ments or omissions. 283 F. Supp. 643, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
232 Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e); see also Ackerman v. Oryx Commc'ns, Inc., 609
F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1987).
233 The credit crisis of Fall 2008 sounds like the same situation that was described in a congres-
sional debate supporting the enactment of the Securities Act:
[The Act exists] to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presen-
tation, against the competition afforded by questionable securities offered to
the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the pros-
pective investor in sound securities; to bring into productive channels of in-
dustry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoard-
ing; and to aid in providing employment and in restoring buying and consum-
ing power.
77 CONG. REc. 2983 (1933). In the same vein Felix Frankfurter, the principal draftsman of the
Securities Act, made these comments about the reasons for the Securities Act:
How to draw the savings of people into great streams of investment and at the
same time to protect those savings from recklessness has been a problem for
statesmanship ever since the advent of large corporate enterprise. Particularly
exigent has this problem been in periods of crisis following speculative de-
bauches. Man's memory is short and hope of gain is an obdurate motive.
When, however, confidence takes flight, it can be coaxed to return permanent-
ly only by prudent safeguards against future devastation.
Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 53.
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panying civil remedies of the Securities Act, although in place for decades, did
little to forestall the current debacle. Those protections were largely unavailable
to investors who purchased the exotic financial products responsible for the
meltdown.
Under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000,234 credit
default swaps were effectively exempted from regulation when that Act pro-
vided they were not securities.235 In addition, credit derivatives and other securi-
tized assets were almost always sold without registration because they were
offered in exempt private placements.2 36 Thus, fraudsters during the meltdown
were undeterred by section 11 's tough civil sanctions.
B. Gustafson's Body-Blow to Defrauded Shareholders
There is no logical reason why those who are sold unregistered securi-
ties in Madoff-like private dealings should have any less robust legal redress for
fraud than individuals who purchase them in an SEC registered offering. The
Securities Act, in fact, appears to provide just such a cause of action, section
12(a)(2).237 It gives investors an unqualified right to sue persons who sell them
securities "by means of' 2 38 a false or misleading prospectus or oral communica-
tion without limiting that remedy, as section 11 does, to financial instruments
registered with the SEC.
The elements of a section 12(a)(2) action roughly parallel those of sec-
tion 11.239 Causation is satisfied if the offering, including the securities pur-
chased by the plaintiff, is sold by means of a misleading prospectus. A plaintiff
234 7 U.S.C. §§ 27-27f (2006).
235 Securities Act § 2A(b); Exchange Act § 3A(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 78c-1 (2006); see also supra
text accompanying note 58.
236 For a lengthy treatment and critical discussion of that exemption from registration by the
author, see Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the
Case for Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L. REv. 647 (2010).
Dodd-Frank attempted to address some of those glaring regulatory deficiencies. See supra text
accompanying note 69.
237 In the Securities Act, this was originally section 12(2) but it was amended to section
12(a)(2). MARC. I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 208 (4th ed. 2007). The earlier
cases thus refer to it as section 12(2) but this article will uniformly call it section 12(a)(2).
238 Securities Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §771(a)(2).
239 Id. Section 12, however, only gives shareholders a cause of action against those who "sell"
them the security. In that regard, it is a narrower remedy than section 11 which provides an ex-
press cause of action against a number of individuals connected to a registered offering. See supra
note 230 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has defined "seller" in the context of a section 12(1) action to include
not just those who pass title to the securities but also those like brokers who solicit such transac-
tions to benefit themselves or their owners. It does not, however, include participants like attor-
neys or accountants who may merely be substantial factors in causing those transactions to take
place. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 623 (1988).
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need not prove that she relied on the misrepresentation or even received the
misleading prospectus. 24 1 And like section 11, a defendant in a 12(a)(2) action
will be liable unless he can establish a "quasi-due diligence" 242 defense that "he
did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission."243
Since the term "prospectus" is defined broadly in the Securities Act as,
among other things, "any . . . communication . . . which offers any security for
sale[,]" it was, therefore, an "article of faith" 244 and, until 1995, section 12(a)(2)
applied to every sale of securities. That was "overwhelmingly, if not unanim-
ously" the opinion of the lower courtS245 and, consequently, unregistered private
placements were done with due-diligence procedures similar to those in public
offerings.24 6
That all changed however in 1995 when the Supreme Court decided
Gustafson v. Alloyed Co. 247 and interpreted section 12(a)(2) narrowly, restricting
its applicability to securities sold in public offerings.248 Gustafson involved the
private sale of the stock in a company where the purchase agreement
represented that the company's financial statements were accurate.249 If an up
coming year-end audit showed otherwise, the disappointed party would be en-
250titled to an alteration in the purchase price.20 When that turned out to be the
case, however, the buyers did not pursue their contract right to an adjusted
amount. Instead, they sued to rescind the entire sale under section 12(a)(2)
claiming the financial statements in the purchase agreement were materially
false. 251
That document literally met the definition of "prospectus" in section
2(a)(10) of the Act because it was "a communication ... which ... confirms the
240 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225. (7th Cir. 1980).
241 Id. at 1226.
242 The apt description is from STEINBERG, supra note 237, at 209.
243 Id.
244 Elliott J. Weiss, Some Further Thoughts on Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
137, 137 (1996).
245 Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal
and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. n. 15 (1995). While all lower courts had
held that section 12(a)(2) applied to every initial sale of securities, private as well as public, sever-
al refused to extend it to cover aftermarket transactions. First Union Disc. Brokerage Servs. v.
Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44 (1 ith Cir. 1993); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925
F.2d 682, 684 (3d Cir. 1991).
246 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Wrong Decision, But It is Still Business
As Usual in the Securities Markets, 31 TULSA. L.J. 509, 518 (1996).
247 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
248 Id. at 579.
249 Id. at 565-66.
250 Id at 565.
251 Id. at 565-66.
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sale of any security."252 The plaintiffs therefore asserted that company's stock
was sold by means of a false prospectus thus giving them a right of action under
section 12(a)(2). In a 5-4 decision, however, the Court's majority said the term
prospectus in that section more logically referred to its usage in section 10 of the
Securities Act which described the document employed in a public stock offer-
ing rather than its broader meaning in the definitional section. 253
Perhaps some of the Justices believed that the plaintiffs in Gustafson
were seizing on a pretext to unfairly seek a broader remedy of rescission than
the more limited price adjustment they had agreed to. Yet the decision brought
immediate and justifiable criticism. In the first instance it came from the four
dissenting justices who pointed out that under the Securities Act's definitional
section the document in question fit squarely within the meaning of prospectus
because it was "a communication . . . which . .. confirm[ed] the sale of any se-
curity."2 54 Strong disapproval also came swiftly from the scholarly community.
The staff of the Harvard Law Review remarked that "the Gustafson ma-
jority reached a decision . . . using demonstrably mistaken reasoning."255 Anoth
er noted authority said, "the reasoning used by the [Gustafson] majority .. . is so
flawed that its full implication will not be known for some time."256 And a well-
respected former SEC commissioner assailed the decision as "motivated more
by politics than any serious examination of the statute."257
The Court's restrictive interpretation of section 12(a)(2) all but rendered
that cause of action superfluous because it then became almost co-extensive
with section 11. 258 Like section 11, section 12(a)(2) is now confined only to
public offerings. That seemed to conflict with an obvious intent by the drafters
to give such potent rights to all those defrauded in the sale of securities, whether
the financial instruments they purchased were registered or not.259
252 Id. at 573-74; Securities Act § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2006).
253 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 568-70.
254 Id. at 585-86.
255 Note, Leading Cases: Securities Laws: Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of_1933, 109 HARv. L. REv. 329, 334 (1995).
256 Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.: Judicial vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG.
L.J. 423, 425 (1996).
257 Roberta S. Karmel, Curtailing Civil Liability, 213 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 20, 1995, at 3.
258 Laura K. Bancroft, Note, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Continued Shrinking of Private-
Placement Remedies Under the 1933 Securities Act, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 149, 187 (1995).
One commentator, however, observed that such a limitation was not quite correct because
certain issuances that were exempt from registration like intrastate offerings under section
3(a)(1 1) and certain small offerings so exempt under section 3(b) could be deemed public. There-
fore section 12(a)(2) could apply to frauds committed there. Weiss, supra note 244, at 152.
259 Legislative history seems to point that way as well. Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which Justice
Breyer joined, contains an extensive discussion of that. Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 599-600. It also
notes that Felix Frankfurter, the principal drafter of the Act, unequivocally stated that view in
other writings as did another future Supreme Court Justice, William 0. Douglas, who was one of
the early chairmen of the SEC. Id. at 601.
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C. The Shrinking 10b-5 Remedy
With the widening of exemptions to registration that have occurred over
the last several decades, 260 Gustafson's harm to investor rights has become fully
apparent. Purchasers of non-registered offerings now only have the implied right
of action under Exchange Act Rule lOb-5 as a federal26' remedy for fraud. The
SEC promulgated that rule in 1942 under authority granted it in section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act. 26 2Among other things it prohibits the making of "any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statement made . . . not misleading . . . in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security." 263
Section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 are criminal provisions but for some time
the lower federal courts, analogizing from common law tort principles, had been
allowing victimized shareholders to bring civil suits under them against the per-
petrators of those frauds. 2 64 At first, those actions appeared to offer advantages
over 12(a)(2) claims because the broader language of 1Ob-5 includes frauds in
the purchase as well as the sale of securities, whereas 12(a)(2) only covers de-
ceitful sales. Rule lOb-5 also does not, by its terms, contain a privity require-
ment like 12(a)(2) which limits recovery to just those who sold the securities.
In the mid-1970s, however, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases
that substantially restricted the reach of lOb-5 private actions. These cases re-
quired that the plaintiff allege an actual purchase of securities had occurred,265
that the defendant acted with scienter,26 6and that the fraud had involved either a
misrepresentation or a nondisclosure of material fact.267 The Court predicated its
decision in each of those cases on the language of section 10(b) itself.
The first of those cases ruled out 1Ob-5 claims arising from a fraud that
caused an investor not to purchase a particular security. 268 The second case
260 For the author's discussion of how those exemptions have been improvidently broadened in
recent years see Morrissey, supra note 229, at 771-80.
261 A number of state securities codes are patterned after section 401(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act. It is like section 12(a)(2) but avoids the term "prospectus," simply giving an ex-
press cause of action against "any person who . . . offers and sells a security by means of any
untrue statement of material fact . . . ." UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a) (1956). The impact of
that provision is limited, however, because federal law preempts state class action suits for fraud
involving publicly-traded securities. See supra text accompanying note 24.
262 Securities Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (2006).
263 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b)-(c) (2011) (promulgated under the Securities Act § 10(b)).
264 One of the earliest decisions recognizing this cause of action was Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court upheld that right in Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) and Superintendent of Insurance of New York
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
265 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975).
266 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
267 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977).
268 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737, 755.
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meant that a claim for negligent misrepresentation was no longer available un-
der that provision2 69 and Congress, in 1995, made the obligatory showing of
scienter even more difficult by requiring such state of mind to be pled with par-
ticular facts before a suit could go forward. 27 0 The third ruling, demanding ac-
tual deception, seemed to preclude claims about fraudulent activity where miss-
tatements or concealments of material fact were not present.2 7'
D. Contrasting 10b-5 with Section 11
Rule 1Ob-5 actions for fraud in non-registered stock sales are thus more
difficult to prosecute than section 11 claims in at least three key ways. The
scienter requirement in lOb-5 now demands that plaintiffs not just prove but
also plead how defendants have acted with that state of mind.272 By contrast,
section 11 provides liability for negligent material misrepresentations. If the
defendants are to avoid liability, they must show they acted with due diligence
to make sure such false statements were not made.273
Further, plaintiffs in a fraud action under section 11 need only allege
that the prospectus contained a materially misleading statement. It then becomes
the defendants' obligation to show the decline in the value of the investors' se-
curities was caused by factors other than the falsehoods. In the 1995 amend-
ments, however, Congress codified a reverse burden of proof in lOb-5 actions
by specifically requiring that plaintiffs prove that their losses resulted from the
defendants' false statements.274
In the 2005 case of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,2 75 the Su-
preme Court further elevated that barrier to recovery.276 The Court had earlier,
as discussed above,277 approved the "fraud on the market theory," which as-
sumes that a stock's price can be distorted by false information. In Dura, how-
ever, the Court ruled that a decline in a share's price after the disclosure of a
falsehood may not automatically indicate that the untrue statement caused the
plaintiff s loss. 27 8 The Dura case therefore makes it more difficult for all securi-
ties purchasers during the time of a fraud to join as a class to seek redress.279
269 The Hochfelder case, however, left open the possibility that reckless behavior might be
sufficient for civil liability under Rule lOb-5. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
270 See supra text accompanying note 119.
271 Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474-75 ("We therefore find inapposite the cases relied upon by
respondents and the court below, in which the breaches of fiduciary duty held violative of Rule
1 Ob-5 included some element of deception.").
272 See supra text accompanying note 119.
273 See supra text accompanying note 231.
274 See supra text accompanying note 119.
275 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
276 Id at 346.
277 Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
278 As the Court in Dura put it:
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The reach of 1 Ob-5 recovery has also been substantially contracted by
two Supreme Court decisions. In the 1994 case Central Bank, N.A. v. First In-
terstate Bank,2 80 the Court ruled that unlike section 11 of the Securities Act
where a number of individuals who brought about the fraud can be held liable,
lOb-5 liability does not extend to aiders and abettors. 28 1 And the Supreme Court
exacerbated that holding more recently in Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific
American282 where it held that only those who actually make a materially false
or misleading statement can be liable under 1Ob-5 even if other participants in
the fraud knowingly scheme to bring it about.283
E. Congress Should Overrule Gustafson or Otherwise Broaden the 1Ob-5
Remedy
In its deliberations on Dodd-Frank, Congress considered restoring aid-
ing-and-abetting liability to 1 Ob-5 actions but ultimately settled upon remanding
the matter for further study.284 As part of its continuing oversight over the regu-
lation of our financial institutions, Congress should go further and act to directly
set straight the inconsistent remedies that our securities laws provide to de-
frauded investors.
The best approach would be for Congress to overrule Gustafson and
make it clear that the section 12(a)(2) direct cause of action will operate as it
was obviously originally intended. Investors would then be able to use it as a
remedy for fraud in the sale of any security. Alternatively, Congress could
achieve much the same result by making the elements of a 1 Ob-5 action, involv-
Given the tangle of factors affecting price, the most logic alone permits us to
say is that the higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing
about a future loss. ... [In that sense one might say that the inflated purchase
price suggests that the misrepresentation . . . "touches upon" a later economic
loss. But, even if that is so, it is insufficient. To "touch upon" a loss is not to
cause a loss, and it is the latter that the law requires.
Id. at 342-43.
279 For two fine pieces respectively speculating on Dura's effect and discussing its progeny see
Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What's Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Review
the Supreme Court's Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
1 (2005) and Langevoort, supra note 111, at 181-84.
280 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
281 Id. at 190.
282 552 U.S. 148 (2008). The Supreme Court recently gave further support to that outlook by
holding that an investment advisor to a mutual fund could not be held liable for false statements
made in the fund's prospectus. Janus Capital Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296,
2304 (2011).
283 Id. at 771-72.
284 Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929Z(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010).
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ing state of mind, participant liability, and causation consistent with the parallel,
forceful provisions of section 11.
All defrauded investors then, regardless of whether they acquired their
financial instruments in public or private offerings, would have the same robust
federal remedies. Unscrupulous promoters and banks would therefore be com-
pelled to deal more honestly with those from whom they seek capital or face
surer claims to redress their unjust dealings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The massive frauds that led to the meltdown not only cheated large
numbers of investors but also ultimately took an unprecedented toll on our na-
tion's economy. Congress has responded with legislation that offers some prom-
ise of safeguarding our financial institutions from the worst of those abuses. If
history provides any perspective, however, government action will hardly be
effective to stop all such fraudulent practices in the future or to compensate
those who are injured by them.
As two commentators put it recently, "[D]oes anyone seriously doubt
that there is immense deterrent power in the contemporary class action? Execu-
tives tempted to lie about earnings are more concerned about Bill Lerach and
Melvyn Weiss [renowned shareholder lawyers] 285 than they are about the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC)."286 Derivative suits and shareholder
class actions are therefore the most powerful tools we have to deter and expose
corporate corruption.
As this Article has discussed, "Pocket-Shifting," and "Circularity" prob-
lems along with issues raised by so-called "professional plaintiffs" are red her-
rings. The first two claim that class actions achieve little compensation for vic-
tims of stock fraud, but that charge not only neglects the obvious deterrent effect
of those actions but also cynically undervalues the real damage awards and oth-
er share enhancements that they bring. In the derivative suit context, courts can-
not forget that lawyers for the shareholders are acting as private attorney gener-
als to fight corporate wrong-doing. In those actions, if a particular plaintiff fails
to meet the formal statutory standards, courts should liberally allow another one
to be substituted who so qualifies.
Rather than focusing on those trivial issues, lawmakers should streng-
then the causes of action available to investors for securities fraud. As this Ar-
285 The work of Messieurs, Lerach and Weiss is well described in a fine current study of share-
holder litigation. DILLON & CANNON, supra note 27. Their firm returned more than $45 billion in
fraud judgments or settlements to millions of shareholders. Id. At the end of their careers, howev-
er, both Lerach and Weiss pled guilty to conspiring to obstruct justice by misrepresenting fee
arrangements in those matters. Id. As a result, they served prison terms and forfeited their licenses
to practice law. Id.
286 Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The
Social Utility ofEntrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 103, 106 (2006).
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ticle has suggested, one important way to do that would be to restore the direct
cause of action provided in section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act for fraud in the
sale of any security.
Alternatively, legislative reforms could correct unduly narrow Supreme
Court cases involving state of mind, causation, and aiding-and-abetting liability
in 1Ob-5 actions. We must take this action as we go into the future to avoid the
mistakes of the past. Such legislation, more than any additional government
regulation, would go a long way to restoring the financial integrity that is essen-
tial to any truly prosperous economy.
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